Introduction
Hybrid Warfare as a method of war is not new. Hybrid Warfare as a method of warfare has its roots in methods of war fighting of past conflicts; while not necessarily new as a category of conflict, it has the potential to change the future conceptualization of conflict.
In military historiography,3 it is easy to find examples of conflicts in which different actors, States and non-State entities alike, aim to reach their political and/or military goals by using a mix of conventional and non-conventional, or irregular, methods, as well as kinetic and non-kinetic means, in very different operational environments.
The variance today appears to be that Hybrid Warfare "has the potential to transform the strategic calculations of potential belligerents [it has become] increasingly sophisticated and deadly".4 Some of the non-kinetic aspects 2 The term Hybrid War/Warfare will be used interchangeably within this article. of Hybrid Warfare share methods with 'influence operations' by aiming to misinform world opinion (like Russia in Crimea and now Syria) or become a powerful 'force multiplier' (like Jihadists and Daesh in the Middle East). These methods have a long history of successful employment. As Sun Tzu once said: " [t] o subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence".5
This short paper briefly presents the concepts of Hybrid Warfare and Lawfare, the use of law as a weapon, and tries to foster discussion and thought on how to use Lawfare affirmatively in support of own objectives and to prevent opponents from successfully using law maliciously for their own purposes and objectives.. For this, we attempt to provide a current, comprehensive definition of Hybrid Warfare and examine some recent developments in this emerging area of study, including some reflection on The North Atlantic Treaty Organization nato's open source perspective on 'Hybrid Threats' . Then, we will take a look at different areas where law has been or is being used as a method of war. Lawfare encompasses both affirmative activities reinforcing the rule of law (often in a defensive context) and its malicious use and exploitation (in an offensive context) by an opponent to achieve strategic objectives. Lawfare can be used successfully in the following three legal fields: the Jus ad bellum, the Jus in bello, and finally the law of treaties in international relations. In detail, we will examine several present and past examples where Lawfare has been employed maliciously in order to erode and delegitimize the opponent by ignoring or even abusing law with the intent to create confusion in internal and external public opinion or to counter any affirmative use of Lawfare to the adversary's tactical or operational advantage. The paper concludes with the observation that Lawfare has become an integral element of any Hybrid Warfare strategy and that its affirmative use has to become an element of Western military thinking and planning.
Hybrid Warfare
We understand that definitions pose a challenge for commentators since they are elusive and tend to leave out key points of the element they are trying to define. However, in general, a shared understanding of the term is necessary for any further discussion. Military writers, predominantly from the us, have discussed Hybrid War since the beginning of the 21st century and its recognition as a theory in formal military doctrinal thinking still not guaranteed. In order to find a binding definition it is important to look at the use of the term . These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict.9 While Hoffman's work on Hybrid Warfare is leading, as it set the militaryhistoriographical scene for recognizing such form of warfare as either 'new' or evolving 'old' warfare, it also makes it clear that there is not yet a binding definition on the notion in place; instead the 'hybrid' element indicates the existence of multiple elements and factors which are somehow merged into a method of warfare.10 With Hoffman's subsequent definition of 'Hybrid' as constituting a modus of war fighting, where the opponent "simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives",11 and Brown's definition12 as a basis, we can try to update the definition of Hybrid Warfare. Hybrid warfare appears to be mainly a warfare variant resulting from using an economy of 'force war' , in which State or non-State actors interact with a minor traditional military investment. These actors will use indirect and multidisciplinary approaches (civil and military, legal and illegal, kinetic and nonkinetic, high-tech and 'rock-art' means, etc.) . These actors can employ means based on those approaches with the following intentions: Among the means and methods used by an adversary in a Hybrid Warfare context to reach the intentions above, we can find 'Lawfare' . Lawfare is using law as a weapon with a goal of manipulating the law by changing legal paradigms. As stated at the outset, this can be done either maliciously or affirmatively. While Lawfare appears to be first defined by Dunlap back in 2001, he refined his definition in 2007, stating that Lawfare "is the strategy of using -or misusing -law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective."16 Before addressing Lawfare in detail, including the fine points of some malicious employment thereof, it is relevant for this paper to address in general terms how the 28 nato States collectively understand hybrid warfare. This is a difficult task as nato does not (yet) have an official definition of Hybrid Warfare, nor of Lawfare, and the latter is rarely mentioned in daily business. In 2011, nato issued a 'longsighted' report, which predicted that States may be attracted by non-conventional wars, as hybrid threats "can be largely nonattributable, and therefore applied in situations where more overt action is ruled out for any number of reasons".22 Hybrid Threats were defined as multimodal, low intensity, kinetic as well as non-kinetic threats to international peace and security.23 Hybrid Threats include asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, transnational organized crime, demographic challenges, resources security, retrenchment from globalization, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We will ensure that nato is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design. It is essential that the Alliance possesses the necessary tools and procedures required to deter and respond effectively to hybrid warfare threats, and the capabilities to reinforce national forces.27
This declaration, as well as subsequent publications and announcements by nato seem to indicate that nato has accepted the reality of facing Hybrid Warfare Threats.28 Whether this amounts to "adapting to the hybrid challenge"29 remains to be seen, as nato does not have a Hybrid Warfare concept in place yet and it seems unlikely that the discontinued cht can act as a substitute without further significant amendments, which requires not only the political will but also a reorganization of the integrated military structure in order to implement it. It can be noted that nato's attitude contrasts with Russia, which on the contrary already has a Hybrid Warfare doctrine (non-linear war or Gerasimov Doctrine)30 in place, which it successfully applied to its campaigns in 2014/2015. The fact that Russia is keen on using non-linear war demonstrates that this type of warfare not only include non-State actors but also states. Today, we have blatant examples of States, like non-State entities do, that find this type of warfare very appealing for it reduces the need for using classical military resources -no need to use only kinetic means. Further, and perhaps more significantly, prima facie it preserves some amount of legitimacy, or at least reduces the erosion of apparent legitimacy, due to the non-attributable aspects inherent in hybrid warfare when using non-lethal Hybrid Warfare methods such as Law fare.
On 1 December 2015, nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, announced the cooperation on aspects of a new Hybrid Warfare program and a new nato Hybrid Warfare Strategy. Currently, challenges by Russia and Daesh, among others, to alter the Euro-Atlantic security order and Middle Eastern stability are executed using elements of Hybrid Warfare. Countering such threats made it necessary for nato to adopt its new Hybrid Warfare strategy, which is to be developed and announced this year.
Law as a Weapon: Zeus versus Hades
Lawfare is, generally speaking, a method of war, like others, using non-kinetic means and intending to influence the adversary for the benefit of strategic objectives. Lawfare has traditionally been seen to have a negative connotation, namely as the use of law by the opponent and not as means of own war fighting capacities, when used affirmatively to achieve own military and political objectives as we will show in this short submission. A parallelism may be used with the eternal fight between good and evil represented by that of Zeus and Hades. Lawfare, as the use of law as a weapon, highlights this: if used to distort the rule of law's leading principles and underpinnings, it would qualify as Hadesian, if used to reaffirm and strengthen the principles of law, it would be Zeusian. At this stage it is important to note that Lawfare can be used in the context of Hybrid Warfare and/or 'influence operations' . Since influence operations mainly consist of "non-kinetic, communications-related, and informational activities that aim to affect cognitive, psychological, motivational, ideational, ideological, and moral characteristics of a target audience",31 Lawfare fits as one of the methods that influence operations can employ. Although Lawfare needs to use communications-related and informational activities through media and Strategic Information Operations (InfoOps/StratCom to become a 'weapon' , Lawfare is not subordinate to them. A good analogy to understand how Lawfare reaches the desired 'target' is to see it as the warhead of a missile, while media and InfoOps/StratCom would be powering the flight of that missile. After seeing some examples below, we may be in a better position to understand Lawfare. The authors are hesitant to provide an absolute definition of the concept of Lawfare, which at this point such would be extremely vague. A most recent commentator, Ordre Kittrie, characterizes Lawfare actions as:
(1) the actor uses law to create the same or similar effects as those traditionally sought from conventional kinetic military actions -including impacting the key armed forces decision-making and capabilities of the target; and (2) one of the actor's motivations is to weaken or destroy an adversary against which the Lawfare is being deployed.32
In the case of the current situation in Russia and Ukraine, Lawfare has its roots in an undefined situation, i.e., the lack of definition of the conflict -international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, or civil unrest. This ambiguous situation creates patent confusion as to the source or paradigm of applicable law and any eventual action to identify and assign legal However, Hybrid Warfare tools, such as Lawfare, are not only focused on jus in bello, but also on areas relating to the interpretation and implementation of international obligations, as we will see below, which fall in the realm of jus ad bellum. In conclusion, 'modern' Hybrid Warfare not only presents challenges to international peace and security, but also undermines current national and international legal frameworks by questioning the validity of existing public international law rules applicable in international relations in peace time and times of war.
The inherent criterion of ambiguity in Hybrid Warfare has to be considered when looking into the impact of this type of war on current international humanitarian law and human rights law, and on public international law in general. The difficulty for defining a hybrid conflict impedes also its characterization as an international armed conflict, a non-international armed conflict, or a simple civil unrest. This creates an uncertainty in the law-abiding party of a hybrid situation, which forces it to demonstrate that an abuse of international law is taking place. Given these legal uncertainties arising from the "fog of Lawfare", it becomes apparent the potential role it actually plays in the context of Hybrid Warfare. Lawfare in this context thrives on legal ambiguity and exploits legal thresholds and fault lines. Applied by an adversary, both State and nonState actors, which untied to the need to comply with international law and the rule of law, Lawfare can exploit the disadvantages of legal restrictions in place for the compliant actor leading to the emergence of "asymmetric warfare by abusing laws".35 33 (n. 21 A commonly recognized methodology for defining the nature of conflict was established by the icty in Tadi: "an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State." 36 These criteria appear to be inadequate or insufficient to characterize conflicts dominated by Hybrid Warfare methods, as these are intended to disguise the actual facts. Therefore, the necessary attribution of direction or control in a conflict, which entirely depends on the appreciation and assessment of facts, becomes a 'mission impossible' in Hybrid Warfare environments where subterfuge dominates the stage. This situation diminishes the authority of international humanitarian law and human rights law (and public international law in general), and parties will then tend to "emphasize the idea of military necessity [,which] deteriorat[es] legal incentives to act humanely".37
The malicious exploitation of international treaty law equates to the abuse of Lawfare as a weapon, means respectively of Hybrid Warfare. There are possibilities to use law as a weapon in a positive manner, affirmatively, i.e., in form of so called "bankrupting terrorism" lawsuits (cf. Shurat HaDin Israel Law Center) using this term to refer to US-Israeli terrorism litigation, referring to civil litigation before us Federal Court which is directed against "funding" activities (e.g. direct payments to terrorist groups) and other forms of aiding and abetting (such as the provision of material support) qualifying as "indirect liability" for acts of Islamist terrorism38 and State sponsored terrorism, such as Russia's liability for shooting down mh-17.39 However, there remains a risk that when using Lawfare affirmatively, the adversary may end up 'boomeranging' it in a malicious manner. These examples show that the abuse or good use of Lawfare are often closely linked, as Lawfare covers any use of law for a specific military purpose.
Lawfare in Armed Conflicts: When Law is Misused and Ignored
As we have seen above, an example of the Another example for the malicious use of Lawfare has been demonstrated by Hamas during the Gaza wars of 2008 and 2014. The European Union strongly condemned Hamas' calls on the civilian population of Gaza to 'offer' themselves as human shields.42 During those two wars Hamas tactic of launching rocket attacks from densely populated areas into Israeli territory was part of its standard operating practice. This amounted to intentionally disregarding international humanitarian law and human rights law. In fact, these violations have to be qualified as a contumelious use of Lawfare. This fact is also disturbing from the standpoint of the principle of reciprocity in International Humanitarian Law. Actually, while disturbing, it also confirms the International Court of Justice's findings in the Nicaragua case, in relation to the lack of reciprocity in non-regular conflicts.43
This malicious employment of Lawfare by Hamas against an adversary following the rule of law, forced Israel to apply much more precise legal calculations regarding target selection and targeting. These deliberations had to take place in the fog of war and with the intention to distinguish, beyond any reasonable doubt, legitimate military targets. It appears that Israel, concerned for its image in the media and mindful of global opinion, may have 'overacted' in its operational proactive Lawfare efforts by increasing the protection of civilians in Gaza through precautions taken and warnings issued to unprecedented levels in modern warfare. This augmented to the point that some think Israel took These two cases appear to suggest that when a party uses Lawfare as a " necessary element of mission accomplishment" in Hybrid Warfare situations,48 the other party, who considers itself in disadvantage force-wise, will transform any adherence to the rule of law by its adversary into a 'legal boomerang' . This boomerang would carry a piece of Hadesian Lawfare, which intends to paralyze the adversary or, at least, anesthetize the rule of lawgovernment/administration structures of that law-abiding adversary. Along these lines, Lin argues:
[T]errorists are waging Lawfare and hijacking the rule of law as another way of fighting, to the detriment of humanitarian values as well as the law itself. Using human shields, abusing international law and post-conflict investigations to blur the line between legitimate counter-terror tactics and human rights violations, Lawfare -similar to terror tunnels -is also becoming an effective counter-measure against the superiority of western air power.49
Drawing the idea from Toni Pfanner,50 in Hybrid Warfare we could argue that, as a consequence of those using weakly and rhetorically international law and judicial processes, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law may become inapplicable, as it provides only partial answers. Moreover, this inapplicability may also be anchored in the idea that abiding by the law may also become inconsistent with perceived interests of the warring parties.
However, two points need to be remarked. First, this understanding would be equivalent to abandoning the legal battlespace to deniers of the rule of law. In this vein, Dunlap considers that "Lawfare is more than something adversaries seek to use against law-abiding societies; it is a resource that democratic militaries can -and should -employ affirmatively".51 Bilsborough considers that this employment must be done by "map[ping] the contours of international law (particularly the law of armed conflict) and structure their operations accordingly".52 There is room for a Zeusian use of Lawfare. In order to prepare military operations within the contours of international law, using Lawfare affirmatively, politicians and commanders alike need to train, before any actual conflict, difficult and complex legal scenarios with major and lasting impact, on internal and external public opinions. These scenarios will have: (i) short-lead response time to prepare a sound moral and legal case for forces intervention; (ii) high political consequences; (iii) likely future court review; and (iv) intervention of international organization53 infiltrated by Hadesian Lawfare practitioners, as well as nongovernmental organizations (ngos),54 and multinationals.55 Consequently, the shaping of the legal battlespace requires drafting contingency plans and conducting exercises based on those premises.
Secondly, we must never forget that public opinion is by nature coachable and therefore malleable. For this reason alone, we cannot afford to think naively and argue that Lawfare has to rely exclusively on its legal paradigms; the legality and legitimacy of (military) action are first and foremost subject to the scrutiny of public opinion. Consequently, any successful counter-Lawfare action, or Zeusian use of Lawfare, against 'boomerangs' must not be limited in scope, but comprehensive and holistic, as it will have to aim at establishing the right perceptions among the internal and external public opinions.
Lawfare in International Relations: When Law is Misused and Abused
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine agreed to transfer the nuclear weapons to Russia and in return it asked for security assurances. In 1994, the so-called Budapest Memorandum56 was signed by Ukraine, Russia, the United 53 "[T]he pa and its allies have turned numerous international organizations into lawfare battlegrounds. As a result, one international organization (unesco) has been weakened by having its budget slashed, and another (the un Human Rights Council) has been largely diverted from accomplishing its original mandate", in Kittrie, supra note 33, at 339. States, and the United Kingdom. In that memorandum, the parties agreed to "respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine" and "refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine".57 In March 2015, Russia argued that any allegation of Russia's violation of its international obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum would show that the text of the agreement had not been read by those alleging Russian involvement in the events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasizes that:
In the memorandum, we also undertook to refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine's territorial integrity or political independence. And this provision has been fully observed. Not a single shot was fired on its territory during which, or before, the people of Crimea and Sevastopol were making crucial decisions on the status of the peninsula. The overwhelming majority of the population of Crimea and Sevastopol, in a free expression of their will, exercised their right to self-determination, and Crimea returned to Russia. As for the ongoing attempts to accuse us of military interference in the events in southeastern Ukraine, the authors of these claims have not presented a shred of conclusive evidence yet.
Furthermore, neither in the Budapest Memorandum, nor in any other document, has Russia pledged to force a section of Ukraine to remain as part of the country against the will of the local population. The loss of Ukraine's territorial integrity has resulted from complicated internal processes, which Russia and its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum have nothing to do with.58
Reading this official statement in conjunction with the official text of the 1994 Budapest Memoradum, we can easily identify a misinformation campaign. The significant element here is that the metaphorical 'warhead' of this Russian campaign is Lawfare. The statement mixes specific characteristics of Hybrid Warfare, namely denial -"Not a single shot was fired on its [Ukraine] territory 57
Ibid., at 2, para. during which, or before, the people of Crimea and Sevastopol were making crucial decisions on the status of the peninsula" -with deliberate disinformation regarding the scope of existing treaty obligations, thus creating deliberately confusion of the public opinion. This outcome is the result of using Lawfare affirmatively, or maliciously, by Russia in a very effective way. Such malicious use of Lawfare to 'negate' the validity of treaties and to void the inherent principle of international law's pacta sunt servanda, qualifies as a concept of treaty abuse, as a special case of the concept of abus de droit.59 This concept of 'abuse of right' relates to situations, where States or international organizations (or other subjects of international law), as parties to an international agreement, interpret and apply its provisions depending on the particular circumstances in order to benefit from such a deviation. In this context, the parties not applying the agreement can claim circumstantially that the other party exercises the agreement's provisions abusively.
An interesting case of Lawfare in international relations is that of Yasser Arafat's off-the-record statements made on 10 May 1994 at a mosque while visiting Johannesburg, South Africa. A journalist from 702 Talk Radio, Bruce Whitfield, secretly recorded it. This took place few months before the signature of the Oslo Accords on 29 August 1994. Arafat alluded cryptically to the agreement comparing it to one of the Prophet Muhammad in similar circumstances:
This agreement I am not considering it more than the agreement which had been signed between our prophet Muhammad and Quraysh. And you remember, Caliph Omar had refused this agreement and considering the agreement of the very low class. But Muhammad had accepted it and we are accepting now this peace accord.60
Arafat's allusion to the Hudaybiyya agreement (truce) was the object of several discussions and disagreements among commentators, which point to a sort of Lawfare. In 628 c.e a group of one thousand Muslims set off for a trip to Mecca in order to perform the umrah pilgrimage. The Muslims hoped that the Meccans would allow them to enter the city, but they did not. To avoid bloodshed, the two parties decided to avoid warfare and concluded an agreement or truce. On the one hand, some commentators thought Arafat sent a clandestine message about his true intentions and read the Quran in a biased manner: The practice of treaty abuse constitutes an incorrect use of the actual agreement, notwithstanding of the violating party's 'justifications' to the contrary. Moreover, the incorrect use of an international agreement cannot be justified by the legal discretiongiven by international law makers to those applying it, as that discretion is not absolute. The limits of discretion are justified by the principle of good faith. In this regard, the International Court of Justice in the Oil Platform case established that:
[t]he Court recalls that, according to customary international law as expressed in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.63 84 journal of international humanitarian legal studies 7 (2016) 63-87 foi qui régit le comportement des sujets du droit international dans leurs rapports mutuels". 66 At this point, we would like to affirm our view that the deliberate non-application of good faith when implementing international agreements amounts to Hadesian Lawfare. However, this can be argued only if the following conditions67 are met: a) Although the action may be permitted by the international agreement, it renders the purpose of the agreement null and void; b) Although the action may be based in the interpretation rules established by Articles 31-33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties, the understanding is clearly unfounded; and c) Although the actions may be difficult to characterize as breaches of an international obligation, the party in breach describes the facts rhetorically using law arguments that clearly demean it.
In support of these criteria, one can argue that the situation in Ukraine shows that Russia has engaged in Hybrid Warfare not only against Ukraine, but also against nato by distorting international law. An example is President Putin's declaration that Russia intervened, under international humanitarian law, "to defend the rights of Russian-speakers living abroad".68 These commentators present Russia's abuse of law and argue that any Russian claim to have the right of intervention in Ukraine under international humanitarian law must prove:
the urgent humanitarian catastrophe it seeks to avert and why there is no alternative to its action […] [i]t should not act by stealth and revert to the "big lie", denying that its forces are engaged, denying that its missile units shot down Malaysian airliner mh17, and pretending to be the peacemaker.69 86 journal of international humanitarian legal studies 7 (2016) 63-87 international responsibility are required to produce empirical data and observations in support of the argument that those using malicious Lawfare, amounting to abus de droit, bear responsibility for internationally wrongful acts.
Conclusion
The main conclusions of this paper is that the inherent complexity and ambiguity of Hybrid Warfare creates not only new security but also legal challenges for those adhering to international law within the frameworks established under and governed by the principles of the rule of law. Unscrupulous and malicious use of Lawfare by State and non-State actors alike must not discourage international actors from continuing to act in compliance with international law. Zeus must not give up in spite of Hades' temporary successes. In such a legal (and ethical) asymmetry law-abiding international environment, actors need to use Lawfare affirmatively to ensure that public international law is being applied within its full remit. Such 'preemptive' Zeusian Lawfare will give the political and military leadership the necessary room to fine-tune the planning and conduction of military operations reflecting on anticipated Lawfare by the opponent. Lawfare counteraction has extreme limitations in terms of time, space and applicable procedures. Law-abiding actors will be confronted with short-lead time for political decision-making and military planning based on incomplete intelligence and open-source information, an incommensurate broadness of the battlespace -tangible and virtual, and the 'dictates' of compliance with the rule of law: to follow democratic procedures and be subject to court review and public opinion scrutiny. Moreover, law-abiding actors will also confront both international organizations to which they belong and which have been 'infected",72 by Hadesian Lawfare and international tribunals used by non-law-abiders who know the non-intuitive nature of international humanitarian law.73 This requires a comprehensive legal approach and broader legal interoperability, which includes the use of affirmative Lawfare in an offensive and defensive manner. This paper on Hybrid War has shown some examples of malicious Lawfare as a central component of a Hybrid Warfare concept of a non-law-abiding opponent-/enemy. Above, the authors offer some suggestions to the political and military leaders of democratic law-abiding States on how to use Lawfare as an element of one's own comprehensive counter-strategy. The examples of Hamas and Russia, which were used in the text to highlight what might become a new trend in 21st century conflict, with the evolving situation in Syria and Iraq highlighting this trend. The use of Hadesian Lawfare yields tangible benefits for its operators as it distorts public opinion and the ethical-legal discourse in societies, which are compliant with international law and the rule of law. This is when the international legal reality gets murky and desperately calls for a Zeusian Lawfare as part of a comprehensive counterstrategy against such threats and means.
Employing Zeusian Lawfare also means that Lawfare must be approached as a means of warfare, a weapon: Lawfare can be used in an offensive (extra warnings, targeting recording, sanctions) or defensive (media training on selected topics, safeguarding of inquiry processes, information liaison with courts) manner against an opponent who is prone to ignoring the rule of law. The examplesof Hamas in Israel/Palestine and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan with their disregard and even contempt for international humanitarian law and human rights law highlight the need for such proactive Lawfare. This, however, requires extensive pre-planning and continuous training of their users in order to convince the political (and military) leadership with sound arguments in support of Lawfare actions to counter the malicious application of law.
To conclude, Lawfare appears taking up a necessary and central role as a main component of current Hybrid Warfare operations and opens a broad spectrum for specialist and collaborative research by both academia and practitioners, for warfare is part of the world we live in. Our role as democratic societies in times of War and Conflict is governed by rules and adherence to the rule of law unlike our opponents' conduct. By opting for affirmative Lawfare qualified within legal constraints, we ensure that our choice of how to respond to threats of Hybrid Warfare will not only be successful but also legitimate.
